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ABSTRACT 
A recent methodology – namely, the belief update task – used in the study of unrealistic 
optimism has provided a mechanistic account of how people maintain positive illusions about 
their future in the face of disconfirming evidence. This methodology has been used in a series 
of neuroscientific studies and neural moderators of unrealistic optimism have been 
established. A subsequent critique of the belief update task by Shah et al. (2016) has cast 
doubt over the validity of these findings however, with the authors instead suggesting that 
apparent optimistic belief updating is in fact a statistical artefact resulting from a flawed 
methodology. Specifically, Shah et al. assert that the inclusion of positive events in the belief 
update task can help test the validity of the optimistic account of belief updating, while 
proponents have suggested that caution should be taken when adapting this task to study 
positive life events because there is a lack of accurate information regarding the likely 
frequency of such events. Using a subset of the life events used by Shah et al., the current 
paper demonstrates that optimistic belief updating should still be observed when positive life 
events are included in the belief update task. 
Keywords: Optimism Bias; Belief Updating; Positive Events; Unrealistic Optimism; 
Motivated Reasoning; Future Projection  
1. Introduction  
In everyday life, people are often faced with decisions that require them to estimate 
the likelihood of certain events happening to them in the future (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Folk-wisdom dictates that knowledge is power and, indeed, the classical view of 
human judgment predicts that future projections should rely on accurate, objective and 
unbiased evidence (e.g. Trope, 1980). However, this normative account has been challenged 
by a second school of academic thought, one that takes a cognitive-affective perspective of 
judgement formation. This school has suggested that an optimism bias is a vital component of 
healthy psychological functioning (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn, Sharot, Walter, Heekeren, & 
Dolan, 2014; Strunk, Lopez, & DeRubeis, 2006; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tyler & Rosier, 
2009) and that humans have a pervasive tendency to make systematically biased probability 
assessments when estimating personal risks (Sharot, 2011; Sharot, 2012). This line of 
reasoning suggests that people ultimately ignore warning signs in order to maintain positive 
hedonic feelings and, consequently, that human cognition acts in a manner more aligned to 
the philosophy ignorance is bliss. 
A few recent papers have critiqued the evidential basis for unrealistic optimism and 
cast some doubt over the validity of the methodologies used to study both comparative and 
absolute optimism (Harris & Hahn, 2011; Harris, Shah, Catmur, Bird, & Hahn, 2013; Shah, 
Harris, Hahn, Catmur, & Bird, 2016). If accurate, this account of the literature is worrisome 
given the use of unrealistic optimism in explaining a number of behavioural effects that occur 
in applied settings, including health (Dillard, McCaul, & Klein, 2006; Jansen et al., 2011; 
Shepherd, 2002; van der Velde, Hooykas, & van der Joop, 1992; van der Velde, van der Joop, 
& Hooykas, 1994), business and finance (Calderon, 1993; Gerrard, Gibbons, & Reis-Bergan, 
1999; Kappes & Sharot, 2015; Puri & Robinson, 2007) and anti-social behaviour (e.g., 
reckless driving; DeJoy, 1999; White, Cunningham, & Titchener, 2011). It is worth noting 
that Shah and colleagues concede that while they doubt the existence of a general optimism 
bias, some specific groups of people such as smokers and gamblers could have higher than 
average levels of optimism, suggesting that optimism is a trait rather than a pervasive 
cognitive bias. Nonetheless, given the widespread interest in unrealistic optimism and the 
recent alternative interpretation of the empirical findings, it is particularly important that tests 
are conducted to systematically investigate the robustness of the methods used to study 
optimism bias. 
1.2. Measuring Unrealistic Optimism 
 1.2.1. The comparative method. Unrealistic optimism was traditionally measured by 
comparing participants’ perceived chances of experiencing negative and positive life events 
with how likely they thought such events were to happen to people generally (Weinstein, 
1980). Unrealistic optimism, or an optimism bias, is said to exist when people expect that 
their personal future outcomes are more favourable than would be predicted by a normative 
model of estimation (Harris & Hahn, 2011; Mckay & Dennett, 2009) and, indeed, results 
from studies using this ‘comparative method’ suggest that healthy people generally expect 
more positive and less negative things to happen to them than the average person (Shepperd 
et al., 2015).  
The results of studies using this comparative method have come under attack though, 
in particular by Harris and Hahn (2011) who showed that unbiased simulated agents would 
produce seemingly optimistic answers when responding to questions used in the comparative 
method.  Because the extant research showing optimism in humans was therefore suggested 
to be confounded, it was of great interest to academics on both side of this debate when a new 
methodology – one that did not rely on people’s comparisons between themselves and the 
average person – not only provided additional evidence in support of a general optimism bias 
but also presented neuroscientific evidence to explain how this bias is maintained.  
1.2.2. The belief update task. This relatively new research paradigm developed by 
Sharot, Korn and Dolan (2011; called the belief update task) has provided further evidence to 
support the existence of an optimism bias as well as a mechanistic account to explain how 
unrealistic optimism persists in the face of disconfirming evidence. Participants in this task 
are asked to estimate the likelihoods of certain adverse life events happening to them in the 
future and are subsequently presented with base rate statistics which display the probabilities 
of these events occurring to someone in the same sociocultural environment as them. In a 
second phase of the task, participants are asked to re-estimate their personal risk for each of 
the life events.  
The amount that participants update their estimates in response to base rate feedback 
is used as a measure of how much they incorporate new information into their belief systems. 
Belief updates are compared across two trial types; trials in which participants receive 
desirable information and those in which they receive undesirable information. Trials are 
classified as ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’, depending on the valence of the event and whether 
the base rate is higher or lower than the participant’s initial estimate (IE) of the likelihood of 
the event happening to them. 
Several studies have shown that healthy participants generally update their beliefs 
more when base rates are desirable compared to undesirable (for a review, see Sharot and 
Garrett, 2016) and have concluded that this mechanism, whereby beliefs selectively update in 
response to desirable information, is responsible for pervasive unrealistic optimism. Using 
neuroimaging techniques, Sharot and colleagues have also shown dissociable patterns of 
neural activation in response to such desirable and undesirable information. For example, 
Sharot et al. (2011) found that desirable estimation errors were positively correlated with 
activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), medial frontal cortex (MFC) and right 
cerebellum, whilst undesirable estimation errors were negatively correlated with activation in 
the right IFG. More crucially, activation in the right IFG differed as a function of individual 
differences in trait optimism. Individuals with high trait optimism scores exhibited reduced 
tracking of undesirable estimation errors in the right IFG relative to those with low scores. 
This latter finding suggests that trait optimism is linked to reduced neural coding of 
undesirable estimation errors. But despite the vast array of behavioural and neuroscientific 
evidence in support of the belief updating hypothesis (Garrett et al., 2014; Garrett & Sharot, 
2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot, Guitart-Massip et al., 
2012; Sharot, Kanai et al., 2012, Sharot et al., 2011), there have also been some concerns 
expressed regarding the methodology that may invalidate these results (Harris et al., 2013; 
Shah et al., 2016). 
1.2.2.1. Updating for positive life events. One critique made by Shah et al. (2016) is 
that the belief update task traditionally only asked participants to make estimates for negative 
life events. Sharot et al. (2011) asked participants to estimate the likelihood of events 
happening or not happening to them in an attempt to overcome this issue, but a Bayesian 
analysis conducted by Shah et al. (2016) showed that estimating the likelihood of a negative 
event not happening is not equivalent to estimating the likelihood of a positive event 
happening. They argued that if a biased task design, rather than biased participants, was 
causing seemingly optimistic updating, the reverse bias (i.e. a pessimism bias) should be 
observed in trials where positive events are used and the statistical design of the task is 
flipped. And, indeed, Shah et al. (2016) found a pessimistic pattern of updating when human 
participants were presented with positive events in this task, suggesting that optimistic 
updating is caused by a statistical artefact rather than a feature of human cognition. This 
finding is contentious, however, because a subsequent study did not find this reversal effect 
when using positive events and, in fact, showed optimistic updating for these stimuli too 
(Garrett & Sharot, 2017).  
It is also important to note that previous studies of comparative optimism have 
reported a ‘valence effect’; participants were shown to exhibit more unrealistic optimism for 
negatively framed future events than positively framed events (Gold & de Sousa, 2011). This 
finding suggests that people are more motivated to make biased judgements when thinking 
about negative compared to positive events – a conclusion that is consistent with loss 
aversion research which has shown that humans prefer to avoid losses rather than acquire 
gains and self-protect rather than self-enhance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1985; Vohs & Luce, 2010). 
1.2.2.2. Problems with randomly generated and skewed base rates. Garrett and 
Sharot (2017) have suggested that caution should be taken when adapting the belief update 
task to study positive life events because there is a lack of accurate information regarding the 
likely frequency of such events. Shah et al. (2016) used bogus statistics in three of their five 
experiments, adding or subtracting a random percentage between 17% and 40% to or from 
participants’ IEs in a uniform distribution.  
Garrett and Sharot (2017) showed, using simulated data, that a skewed distribution of 
base rates will systematically and unequally affect belief updating, thus making it appear that 
people incorporate positive and negative information asymmetrically. Because people 
generally update more as estimation errors increase (Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Sharot & 
Garrett, 2016), any difference in the size of estimation errors across conditions in this task 
may lead to an artificial asymmetry in updating. As a result, it is vital either to make sure that 
base rates for positive and negative events are normally distributed around the same point or 
to appropriately control for estimation errors.  
The formula used to generate base rate feedback in Shah et al.’s (2016) experiments 
was biased to produce larger estimation errors for more probable events because 17-40% of a 
large IE (e.g. 0.4*99 = 39.6) will necessarily produce a greater estimation error than 17-40% 
of a smaller IE (e.g. 0.4*1 = 0.4). Therefore, if IEs were higher for desirable than undesirable 
trials we should expect to observe larger estimation errors for desirable trials and, thus, 
greater updating too. If the reverse were true and IEs were higher for undesirable information, 
estimation errors should be larger in undesirable than desirable trials, thus biasing 
participants to update more in response to undesirable than desirable information. 
 In Shah et al.’s (2016) experiments, participants tended to submit higher IEs for 
undesirable than desirable information when estimating the likelihood of positive events. The 
implications of this asymmetry are serious because an imbalance in estimation errors across 
conditions will likely exist if a biased base rate generator is used. And indeed, in all of Shah 
et al.’s (2016) experiments, estimation errors were greater in the positive event conditions 
when undesirable, as compared to desirable, information was presented. The average 
estimation error across their experiments was 10.33 (positive events = 10.47; negative events 
= 10.19), meaning that after participants entered their IE they were shown a figure indicating 
the base rate was approximately 10 percentage points higher or lower than they first thought. 
However, there were marked differences depending on the desirability of the information. 
When positive events were presented, the average estimation error was 13.61 for undesirable 
information but only 7.33 for desirable information. The reverse pattern occurred for negative 
events, although to a lesser extent (desirable information = 12.07; undesirable information = 
8.30). Without appropriately controlling for estimation errors, such differences will 
selectively influence update scores. 
It is important to note that in two of Shah et al.’s (2016) experiments the base rates 
were not experimentally manipulated. The base rates in these experiments were derived from 
externally sourced data (Harris, 2009), rather than the participant’s IEs, and held constant 
across participants. The base rates in these two experiments were positively skewed however, 
due to the selection of events, to make the end result the same – estimation errors were much 
larger for undesirable than desirable information in positive event trials (and smaller in 
negative event trials). This outcome happens when base rates are positively skewed because 
estimation errors are small when the participants’ IE is low and estimation errors are large 
when the participants’ IE is high. Again, larger estimation errors for undesirable than for 
desirable information are produced for positive events, while the reverse is true for negative 
events (for more details, see Garrett & Sharot, 2017). 
1.3. The Current Study 
Previous update task studies that have included positive events into the design have 
produced mixed findings. One of the aims of this study was to investigate whether a 
pessimistic pattern of belief updating would be observed for positive life events in this task, 
as found by Shah et al. (2016), or whether optimistic belief updating would be observed as 
was the case in Garrett and Sharot (2017).  
These two previous studies included positive life events but differed in their design, 
which may explain the contrasting findings. Specifically, Garrett and Sharot (2017) 
conducted a pre-experimental survey to assess how often a selection of positive and negative 
events happened to people, on average, over the last four weeks and used the results of this 
survey to generate base rate feedback that was normally distributed around a mean of 50% in 
a belief update task undertaken by a separate group of participants. Their experiment was 
thus fundamentally different from the studies done by Shah et al. (2016) for three reasons: 
firstly, participants were asked to provide likelihood estimates for events that might occur in 
the next four weeks rather than over the course of a lifetime; secondly, the base rates were not 
randomly generated based on participants IEs but were instead based on the results of a pre-
experimental survey and held constant across participants; and thirdly, base rates were 
normally distributed around the 50% midpoint of the scale for both negative and positive 
events. 
The current study used the same experimental design as Shah et al. (2016), but half of 
the events (20 positive and 20 negative) used in their experiment were removed and, while 
the base rate statistics were still derived from participants’ IEs, the probabilities presented to 
participants were calculated using absolute, rather than proportional, differences from the IEs 
to provide more balanced estimation errors. 
In the current study, participants thought about and wrote down how or why the life 
event presented in each trial would happen to them or simply imagined and wrote down the 
event. After writing down each event, they completed a trial of the belief update task; they 
were asked to estimate how likely they thought the event was to happen to them, were 
subsequently presented with a (bogus) population base rate that indicated how prevalent the 
event was more generally, and were then immediately asked to revise their estimates 
(Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). The difference between people’s IEs and their re-estimates acted 
as the dependent measure, and this update was compared across desirable and undesirable 
conditions for both positive and negative event trials.  
We expected to observe the usual optimistically biased pattern of responding when 
participants thought about negative events and therefore hypothesised that belief updating 
would be greater for good news than for bad news in negative event trials. In the positive 
event trials, we hypothesised that there would be less optimistic belief updating than in the 
negative trials or possibly pessimistic belief updating as has been reported previously. 
2. METHOD 
2.1. Participants 
Sixty participants were recruited through the UCL Psychology Subject Pool. Nine 
participants were excluded because they scored above the threshold for moderate depression 
(9) on the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9). Thus, there were 51 participants (33 
females and 18 males), aged between 18 and 58 (M = 24.90, SD = 7.11). Participants were 
naïve to the specific purpose of the experiment and were simply told that the aim was to 
examine “people’s judgments and perceptions of uncertain events.” Participants all gave 
written informed consent and were compensated for their time. The study was approved by 
the UCL Department of Experimental Psychology Ethics Chair. 
2.2. Event Stimuli  
Short descriptions of 20 negative life events and 20 positive life events were used as 
event stimuli. The stimuli were a subset of those used by Shah et al. (2016) and relate to 
many different life domains (e.g. health, interpersonal relations, and random luck). Shah et al. 
used 80 rather than 40 stimuli, however pilot testing revealed that many of the events were 
perceived to be extremely likely to happen while others were not compatible with a priming 
manipulation that two-thirds of the participants were exposed to (the priming manipulation 
failed a manipulation check and the effects, although controlled for, are not reported in this 
paper). These events were therefore not used in this study. Average IEs showed that 
participants did not expect any of the events to occur with a likelihood lower than 10% or 
greater than 90% (see Appendix A).  
2.3. Design and Procedure 
This experiment used a 2 (event type: negative, positive) x 2 (information desirability: 
undesirable, desirable) within-subjects design. In sum, participants completed the belief 
update task, a funnelled debrief, stimulus evaluations and post-experimental measures in the 
UCL Psychology testing cubicles. Completion of the experiment took approximately 40 min. 
2.3.1. Belief update task. All 40 trials of the experimental task were completed in 
one block. Participants were presented with a written set of standardized instructions and a 
block of three practice trials (which consisted of events that were not used in the 
experimental phase). The belief update task was programmed and delivered using MATLAB 
Cogent 2000 toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). 
Participants were presented with the series of life events one by one on a screen with a 
black background. Events were presented in white font and positioned in the centre of the 
screen. For each trial, they were asked to imagine the event happening to them in the future 
and instructed to write down on paper either the words on the screen (e.g. Miss a flight) or 
why or how life the event would happen to them. After this, the words, “Estimation of 
happening?” appeared on screen and participants were instructed to enter their IE - how likely 
they believed the event was to happen to them in the future – in the form of a two-digit 
numerical probability, using the keyboard. There was a time limit of 8 s for the initial 
estimation phase. Once the IE had been inputted (or the time limit was exceeded), a white 
fixation cross appeared on screen for 1 s. Subsequently, the words “Average likelihood of 
happening” appeared on screen for 2 s, accompanied by a base rate statistic which ostensibly 
showed the average likelihood among the general population. A fixation cross then 
reappeared for 1 s followed by the words “Re-estimation of happening?” and participants 
were given a further 8 s to input their second estimation. 
(Insert Figure 1) 
In contrast with Garrett and Sharot’s (2017) procedure, in which true average base 
rates were presented to participants, base rates in this study were systematically manipulated. 
Specifically, statistics were derived from the participant’s IEs; a random percentage between 
3% and 25% (see, Kuzmanovic et al., 2015) was added to or subtracted from the participant’s 
IEs. The base rate statistic provided participants with new, ostensibly objective, information 
that could help them to estimate how likely the event was to happen to them. The population 
base rate statistics were capped at 10% and 90% because very rare and very common events 
had purposefully been avoided. 
2.3.2. Stimulus evaluation. A number of event characteristics, including familiarity, 
emotional arousal, valence, and base rate prevalence, have been found to modulate the 
optimism bias (e.g. Rose, Endo, Windschitl, & Suls, 2008). Participants were therefore asked 
to provide ratings on 7-point scales for familiarity (from 1 = completely unfamiliar to 7 = 
completely familiar) and strength of valence (from 1 = very negative to 7 = very positive) for 
each event after the belief update task. 
2.3.3. Post-experimental measures. Participants were asked to complete two post-
experimental self-report measures: the Life Orientation Test Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, 
Carver, & Bridges, 1994) and the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, 
& Williams, 2001). The LOT-R measures trait optimism and consists of 10 items which are 
rated on a 5-point scale (e.g. "In uncertain times, I usually expect the best"; Cronbach’s α = 
.79), with total scores ranging from 0 (pessimistic) to 24 (optimistic). The PHQ-9 is a 
measure of depression with total scores ranging from 0 (minimal depression) to 27 (severe 
depression). This scale was chosen for its brevity and because it is a well-validated measure 
that is widely used for measuring depression severity (Martin, Rief, Klaiberg & Braehler, 
2006). The PHQ-9 consists of 9 items that relate to depressive symptoms (e.g. Feeling down, 
depressed, or hopeless). Participants rate how often they have experienced these depressive 
symptoms over the past two weeks on a 4-point scale, from “0” (not at all) to “3” (nearly 
every day; Cronbach’s α = .89). 
2.3.4. Debrief procedure. A funnelled debrief was used to give participants a chance 
to report any suppositions or doubts they had about the statistical information or the purpose 
of the study more generally. Answers to these questions showed that many of the participants 
deduced that belief updates were being measured, but none conjectured that belief updates 
might be dependent on the event type or desirability of the base rates, nor did they suspect 
that the base rates were false, although some claimed that they were “surprised” by certain 
statistics. 
2.4. Analysis 
Data were analysed using IBM SPSS Advanced Statistics 22.0 (International Business 
Machines Corporation, Armonk, NY). For each trial, estimation errors and belief update 
scores were calculated. Estimation errors were calculated as the difference between the 
participant’s IE and the feedback given (by subtracting the IE from the base rate). As such, 
estimation errors were defined as positive when the base rate probability was greater than the 
IE and negative when the base rate probability was lower. Trials were classified as 
“desirable” in positive event trials when estimation errors were positive (i.e. something good 
is more likely than initially expected) and when estimation errors were negative in negative 
event trials (i.e. something bad is less likely than initially expected). The reverse was true for 
“undesirable” trials. 
Belief updates were defined as the difference between the first and second probability 
estimates. These were calculated by subtracting the IE from the re-estimate (RE) when the 
estimation error was positive, and by subtracting the RE from the IE when the estimation 
error was negative. As a result, positive updates indicated a move towards the base rate 
probability regardless of event type or the desirability of the information, while negative 
scores indicated a move away from the base rate (see Appendix B). 
In total, each of the participants (N = 51) gave two estimates for each of the 40 trials. 
Trials were excluded if the participant did not enter an estimate after the specified maximum 
time (8 s for each estimate). To reduce the impact of extreme updating and input mistakes, 
updates that exceeded a certain threshold (±3 × the interquartile range) were classified as 
outliers and removed from the data (as in Shah et al., 2016). 
Unlike any previous belief update task experiments (Garrett et al., 2014; Garrett & 
Sharot, 2017; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Kuzmanovic, Rigoux, & Vogeley, 2016; Moutsiana 
et al., 2013, 2015; Shah et al., 2016; Sharot, Guitart-Massip et al., 2012; Sharot, Kanai et al., 
2012; Sharot et al., 2011; Sunstein, Bobadilla-Suarez, Lazzaro, & Sharot, 2016), a linear 
mixed model (LMM) was used to analyse the data with update scores entered as the 
dependent variable. Information desirability (desirable/undesirable) and event type (positive 
event/negative event) were entered as fixed factors, subject as a random factor, and absolute 
estimation errors, strength of valence of events and familiarity of events entered as 
covariates. Two LMM procedures were carried out; the analysis was conducted using data 
from all 51 participants and was conducted again using only the control participants (N = 19) 
who were not exposed to the priming manipulation (described below). The results of a 
repeated-measures Analysis of Covariance (rmANCOVA; N = 51) are also reported so that 
results can be compared with previous studies. In this latter analysis, a covariate controlling 
for the average difference in estimation errors across trial conditions (per participant) was 
included. 
2.4.1. Controlling for a Priming Manipulation. A second aim of this study was to 
test whether optimistic belief updating is influenced by the level of construal at which 
information is processed. Two thirds of the participants in the current study wrote about 
either why or how life events would occur before being asked to provide probability 
estimates, as doing so was predicted to manipulate the level of construal, while the remaining 
third (N = 19) acted as a control group. Because a manipulation check showed that 
participants struggled to follow the instructions for the construal level manipulation, the data 
from all participants (N = 51) were collapsed and priming condition was accounted for in the 
first LMM and the rmANCOVA analyses. A second LMM analysis was also conducted, with 
participants from the priming conditions excluded (N = 19). 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Task Analysis 
3.1.1. Experimental Trials. Of the total 2,040 trials, 98 were excluded because 
participants either failed to input a response, entered an invalid response or entered extreme 
re-estimates. Following these exclusions, there was no significant difference in the number of 
trials between the positive (n = 972) and negative (n = 970) event conditions (χ2 (1, 1941) = 
.002, p = .96). There was, however, a significant difference between the number of trials in 
the desirable information (n = 873) and undesirable information (n = 1069) conditions (χ2 (1, 
1941) = 19.78, p < .001). This difference also existed before any trials were excluded (χ2 (1, 
2019) = 18.07, p < .001), suggesting that the base rate generator was ‘forced’ to produce 
more undesirable trials due to an imbalance in participants’ IEs for positive and negative 
events.    
3.1.2. Initial Estimates & Estimation Errors. Participants' IEs were lower than the 
50% midpoint for both negative events (M = 34.09, SD = 24.65) and positive events (M = 
41.85, SD = 29.96). The IEs show that participants expected the positive events to occur more 
frequently than the negative events (F(1,50) = 21.82, p < .001; see Appendix C for more 
details). 
Estimation errors were equal across the negative and positive event conditions 
(F(1,50) = .47, p = .50) and the desirable information and undesirable information conditions 
(F(1,50) = 3.63, p = .062), but there was a significant interaction between these two 
conditions (F(1,50) = 22.76, p < .001) showing that the prevalence of low IEs gave the base 
rate generator more ‘room’ for positive estimation errors than negative estimation errors 
(negative events, undesirable information: M = 14.39, SD = 6.52; negative events, desirable 
information: M = 12.44, SD = 6.81; positive events, undesirable information: M = 12.96, SD 
= 6.51; positive events, desirable information: M = 14.30, SD = 6.28). 
3.1.3. Base Rates. The base rate statistics were derived from participants’ IEs, and, 
because average IEs were below 50%, the distributions of base rates had a slight positive 
skew for both negative (skewness = .69, SE = .079; kurtosis = -.50, SE = .16) and positive 
event conditions (skewness = .33, SE = .078; kurtosis = -.1.24, SE = .16). The distribution of 
base rates was less skewed for positive events than for negative events, which is not 
surprising given that IEs were closer to 50% in the positive event condition, though the 
distribution for positive events had a heavier right tail as evidenced by the greater kurtosis. 
(Insert Figure 2) 
3.1.4. Event Evaluation. The positive events were rated as more familiar (t(19) = 
8.11, p < .001) and were considered to be weaker in their valence (t(19) = 7.06, p < .001) than 
the negative events. To account for this difference, strength of valence and familiarity of 
event were included as covariates in the LMM analysis. 
3.2. Linear Mixed Models 
3.2.1. Full data set. Asymmetric belief updating was observed: there was a main 
effect of information desirability, with participants updating their estimates more in response 
to desirable information (M = 6.37, SD = 7.90) than undesirable information (M = 4.25, SD = 
6.94; F(1,1933) = 40.58, p < .001). There was also a main effect of event valence, with 
participants updating their estimates more in response to negative events (M = 5.80, SD = 
7.51) than positive events (M = 4.82, SD = 7.36; F(1,1933) = 6.52, p = .011), and a 
significant interaction effect between event type and desirability (F(1,1933) = 22.88, p < 
.001). A further analysis revealed that optimistic belief updating was exhibited for negative 
events (desirable information: M = 7.67, SD = 8.38; undesirable information: M = 3.92, SD = 
6.83; F(1,1933) = 59.50, p < .001) but not positive life events (desirable information: M = 
5.07, SD = 7.51; undesirable information: M = 4.58, SD = 7.10; F(1,1933) = 1.10, p = .30). It 
is important to note, though, that when the covariates (EEs, familiarity of events and strength 
of valence of events) were not included in this model, or when IEs were controlled for instead 
of EEs (as recommended by Shah et al., 2016), optimistic updating was observed for positive 
events, as well as for negative events. 
Control condition. When the participants in the priming conditions were excluded (N 
= 19), a similar pattern was observed: there was a significant main effect of information 
desirability (F(1,717) = 29.22, p < .001) and a significant interaction between event type and 
information desirability (F(1,717) = 10.10, p = .002), with participants updating more in 
response to desirable information (M = 7.68, SD = 8.64) than undesirable information (M = 
3.01, SD = 5.46) for negative life events (F(1,717) = 34.80, p < .001) but not for positive life 
events (desirable information: M = 5.41, SD = 7.61; undesirable information: M = 4.22, SD = 
5.46; F(1,717) = 2.49, p = .12). There was, however, no main effect of event type (F(1,717) = 
.747, p = .39). Again, when the covariates were not included in this model, or when IEs were 
controlled for instead of EEs, optimistic updating was observed for positive events too. 
3.3. Repeated-Measures ANCOVA 
Comparing event type and information desirability at the condition level rather than 
by trial, as has been done in the past, also produced similar results. With all participants (N = 
51) included, there was a significant main effect of information desirability (desirable 
information: M = 6.61, SD = 4.09; undesirable information: M = 4.32, SD = 2.93; F(1,47) = 
12.35, p = .001), a main effect of event type (positive events: M = 4.92, SD = 3.02; negative 
events: M = 6.01, SD = 3.44; F(1,47) = 5.77, p = .02) but no interaction between event type 
and information desirability (F(1,47) = 1.26, p = .27).  
(Insert Figure 3) 
4. DISCUSSION 
Shah et al. (2016) have claimed that including positive life events should reveal a 
fundamental flaw in the belief update task. In the current study, however, this was not the 
case. The results presented here suggest that people are optimistically biased when updating 
beliefs for negative but not positive events; the flip in asymmetric updating across negative 
and positive events observed by Shah et al. was not replicated in the current study. Consistent 
with previous theories of unrealistic optimism (Garrett et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; 
Sharot et al., 2011; Shepperd et al., 2015; Weinstein, 1980), the evidence suggests that people 
selectively incorporate desirable information about their future into their beliefs while, by 
comparison, largely disregarding undesirable information. Overall, the results presented here 
are therefore more similar to those of Garrett and Sharot (2017) than of Shah et al. (2016), 
despite using the same methodology as Shah et al. (2016) with only small adjustments to the 
set of events included and the formula used to generate base rate feedback. 
Shah et al. (2016) claim that if biased updating is in fact caused by a statistical 
artefact, then including positive events into this task should result in unbiased updating 
overall as the effects on updating across the two event type conditions should cancel each 
other out. Essentially, if the task is biased to produce greater updating for negative than 
positive estimation errors, we should expect to see optimistic updating for negative events 
and pessimistic updating for positive events. The fact that this does not happen suggests that 
optimistic updating for negative events is not due to a flawed methodology but is the result of 
a cognitive bias. We did not, however, observe optimistic updating for positive events, as has 
been reported elsewhere (Garrett & Sharot, 2017), suggesting that more research needs to be 
conducted to understand when and why people exhibit biased probability updating when 
given new information about the likelihood of future positive life events.  
4.1. Initial Estimates, Base Rates and Estimation Errors 
The population base rates that were presented to participants in this study were 
derived from their IEs, as in other recent belief update task experiments (Kuzmanovic et al., 
2015; Shah et al., 2016), due to the lack of accurate information regarding the likely 
frequency of positive events. This contrasts with the traditional approach used by Sharot et al. 
(2011) of providing genuine population statistics (about negative events) sourced from online 
resources (e.g. the Office for National Statistics). Care must be taken when deciding how to 
select and control for the base rate statistics because differences across conditions can affect 
the magnitude of belief updating at the group level. In the current experiment, even though 
the base rates were false, the formula used to generate these statistics was designed to reduce 
such differences. 
In this experiment, base rates and IEs were both positively skewed while estimation 
errors, though generally equivalent across the event type and information desirability 
conditions, were greater when base rates were higher than IEs (i.e., positive estimation 
errors). The base rate generator was unable to produce large negative estimation errors for 
low IEs (e.g., 20%) because base rates were capped at 10%. Therefore, for IEs of 20%, the 
base rate generator would either produce a small negative estimation error (between 3-10%) 
or would produce a positive estimation error of any size (between 3-25%). Note, though, that 
the differences between conditions were relatively small because the base rate statistics were 
calculated using absolute, rather than proportional, differences from participants’ IEs and 
differences in estimation errors were properly controlled for, by trial rather than condition, in 
the LMM analyses. 
The main difference between our paradigm and that of Shah et al (2016) is that Shah 
et al. generated base rates by adding or subtracting a random percentage between 17% and 
40% of the IE to or from participants’ IEs instead of adding and subtracting absolute 
percentages. Doing so will necessarily lead to unequal estimation errors when IEs are larger 
in one condition than another, with larger estimation errors for IEs that are at the higher end 
of the scale (i.e., very commonly occurring events). In our study, absolute percentage 
increases and decreases of 3%-25% were used to generate the base rate statistics in order to 
avoid this pitfall. Given the imbalance of estimation errors in Shah et al.’s experiments and 
the confounding effects that these have on belief updates, it seems that the adaptations to the 
base rate generator and the event stimuli (which affect participants’ IEs and thus the base 
rates generated) in the current experiment can explain the difference in results. 
4.2. Statistical Analysis Procedure 
The LMM approach was taken, rather than the more commonly used rmANCOVA, 
because it is more appropriate to analyse updates by event rather than condition and control 
for estimation errors by trial rather than controlling for average differences in estimation 
errors across conditions. This was the first belief update task experiment to use the LMM 
procedure, although two recent studies have used a trial-by-trial analysis (Garrett & Sharot, 
2017; Kuzmanovic et al., 2016). Note however that although it is possible to measure updates 
using two general linear models, one for negative life events and one for positive life events, 
this method requires an additional test, the analysis will be subject to multiple comparisons, 
and higher significance thresholds will need to be applied. Furthermore, the general linear 
models analysis does not produce results for the interaction effect between event type and 
information desirability. The LMM procedure therefore offers a cleaner and more precise 
approach than the other two analyses that have been used previously. 
Of note, in the current study the interaction effect between event type and information 
desirability reported for the LMM analyses did not hold when using the rmANCOVA. As 
stated previously, the LMM procedure allows the researcher to analyse data by trial rather 
than across conditions. This enhanced control should therefore provide a more fine-grained 
analysis and detect effects that the rmANCOVA does not. The fact that this interaction was 
not significant in the rmANCOVA analysis, even though unbiased updating was observed for 
positive events, provides strong evidence that more precise findings can be obtained when 
using the LMM procedure for this task. 
4.3. Theoretical Contributions and Future Research 
Future studies should seek to disentangle if and when people exhibit biased belief 
updating in response to new information about the likelihood of future positive events. In 
contrast to Garrett and Sharot (2017), the results presented here suggest that positive and 
negative events have different effects on motivated reasoning and biased learning. This 
finding is consistent with much of the extant literature: Gold and de Sousa (2011) have 
previously argued that predictions about positive events are less biased than negative events, 
while previous well-documented psychological theories have suggested that humans have a 
stronger desire to avoid economic losses than acquire gains and, with regard to self-identity, 
self-protect rather than self-enhance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1985; 
Vohs & Luce, 2010). It seems that the same principle may apply when humans think about 
personal future outcomes. 
Given the previous theoretical contributions, we would speculate that a difference in 
motivated reasoning and biased information integration for positive and negative events may 
be due to the asymmetric consequences that positive and negative events are likely to have 
had on human life over the course of evolution. Indeed, a lack of pleasurable events in one’s 
future may be disappointing but is unlikely to be fatal. However, experiencing a truly 
negative event, for most of human history, would have likely resulted in an increased risk of 
death. Appropriately or overly focusing on new information about the increased likelihood of 
such tragedies can trigger feelings of hopelessness, depression and behavioural inhibition, 
and thus hinder productive daily functioning (Garrett et al., 2014; Sharot, 2011; Varki, 2009). 
Thus, humans may have developed a selective bias to prevent such a decrease in motivation 
and productivity. 
It is unclear why these findings differ from those reported by Garrett and Sharot 
(2017), but, as mentioned earlier, their experiment was fundamentally different from the one 
presented here for three reasons. Garrett and Sharot asked participants to estimate the 
probability of events occurring in the next four weeks rather than over the course of a 
lifetime, provided them with genuine base rate information rather than bogus statistics 
generated based on the participants’ IE, and used base rates that were normally distributed 
around the 50% midpoint of the scale. It is therefore possible that humans update beliefs in an 
optimistic manner when given new information about concrete, temporally proximal future 
positive events but do not do so for positive events that may occur sometime in the distant 
future. It is also possible that participants were unbiased for positive events in our study 
because they were more suspicious of the base rates presented in these trials than they were 
for negative event trials. Even though participants did not report any explicit suspicions about 
the truth of the base rates, if participants believed that the base rate feedback presented for 
positive events was not credible they may have given less weight to these statistics and thus 
updated less in these trials. 
Finally, there are still other questions remaining about the methodology used in the 
belief update task that need to be resolved. Shah et al. (2016) point out that the desirability of 
base rate information cannot be assessed without knowledge of the participant’s previous 
estimate of the base rate because there are in fact two ways that a person can receive new 
information about their personal risks: learning new information about population base rates 
or learning new diagnostic information that will affect their personal vulnerability. When 
estimating personal risk, both types of information should be considered. Consequently, 
participants in the update task may have additional diagnostic information regarding their 
own personal risk which is not presented to the researchers but does affect their estimations. 
While other studies have shown that accounting for the difference between participants’ 
initial estimates of the average base rates and the base rates provided by the experimenter 
does not alter the observed pattern of optimistic updating (Garrett & Sharot, 2014; 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2015), more work is needed to better understand how much the credibility 
of the base rates and the diagnosticity of evidence of personal vulnerability affects belief 
updating.  
In conclusion, this study has provided evidence to support the existence of a general 
and pervasive optimism bias, which adds to the current debate around the robustness of the 
methodologies used to measure unrealistic optimism. In particular, the statistical artefact 
account of the belief update task’s findings was challenged. The current study showed that 
changing the way that base rate information (about the occurrences of life events) is 
generated in order to minimize any imbalances in estimation errors across conditions results 
in an optimistic pattern of belief updating for negative but not positive events. The results 
may, therefore, signal the presence of a valence-dependent evolutionary cognitive 
mechanism.  
Figure Legends 
Figure 1: The Belief Update Task. The time-course of a single experimental trial in the belief 
update task. Each trial began with the presentation of one of the 40 life events and participants 
were asked to write down the words displayed. Participants were given unlimited time to write 
the event. Following this, they were requested to estimate the likelihood of the event occurring 
at some point in their lives (duration 8 s). Following an inter-stimulus interval of 1 s, 
participants were presented with a population base rate figure (2 s). An inter-stimulus interval 
of 1 s intervened, then participants were asked to provide a re-estimate (8 s). In this example, 
a negative event is shown, the base rate is lower than initial estimate and the information 
presented is classified as desirable information. The update in this example is eight percentage 
points. Maximum durations, in seconds, are provided below the screen displays. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the base rate statistics presented to participants. The base rates were 
positively skewed for both negative and positive events. 
 
Figure 3: Bar graph showing mean update scores as a function of life event (positive or 
negative). Plots show desirable (red bars) and undesirable (blue bars) information. (A) The full 
data set was analysed using the Linear Mixed Model procedure. (B) The control condition was 
analysed using the Linear Mixed Model procedure. (C) The full data set was analysed using 
the repeated measures Analysis of Covariance procedure. Error bars use the standard error of 
the mean. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1: Full list of the 40 event stimuli. Participants mean (M) initial estimates for each event 
in the belief update task (standard deviations (SD) are provided). 
 Initial Estimates 
Event Stimuli M SD 
Accidentally putting an electronic device in the washing machine 26.15 23.90 
Being arrested 15.10 19.06 
Finding your partner cheating on you 37.40 22.42 
Finding yourself in unmanageable debt 20.98 15.44 
Being sworn at in public 52.88 30.04 
Bone fracture 35.91 25.65 
Domestic burglary 32.96 19.99 
Falling down stairs 43.62 25.65 
Food poisoning with need to visit a doctor 43.30 27.06 
Fraud when buying something on the internet 38.46 22.37 
Get trapped in a lift 26.57 20.81 
Having a stroke 28.90 18.26 
House vandalised 25.24 20.18 
Losing mobile phone 45.73 27.86 
Losing wallet 40.00 26.44 
Miss a flight 34.41 26.71 
Theft from your vehicle 28.82 18.35 
Vehicle (car/ bike) stolen 36.10 27.26 
Victim of bullying at work (nonphysical) 35.13 22.13 
Victim of mugging 32.19 18.78 
Attending a family member's wedding 74.48 25.78 
Receiving a standing ovation from a large audience 34.42 25.93 
Buying a new house 57.84 31.33 
Maintaining a constant healthy weight for 10 years 57.91 30.74 
Finding £10 or more on the street 39.00 29.21 
Getting a large bonus payment at work 45.06 23.92 
Getting a new pet animal 44.77 28.22 
Going to a movie premiere 35.29 28.33 
Having a book/article published 48.92 31.62 
Having a healthy child 67.31 25.03 
Making a profit when selling a valuable item 52.71 27.13 
Meeting a member of the royal family 21.21 22.13 
Raise over £1000 for charity 39.06 25.38 
Seeing someone famous while on public transport 37.70 23.37 
Upgraded to first class on a flight 28.20 23.69 
Winning a prize in a media (TV/radio/newspaper) competition 27.06 21.47 
Winning a race 25.84 25.40 
Winning a raffle at a fairground 19.70 19.68 
Winning an award in recognition of your work 46.10 28.29 
Your achievements in newspaper 34.56 29.61 
Events used during the training session   
Dying before 90 n/a n/a 
Glaucoma n/a n/a 
Post-traumatic stress disorder n/a n/a 
   
 
Appendix B 
The formula used to calculate estimation errors was as follows. IE is participants’ initial 
probability estimate. BR is the average base rate statistic that was presented after participants 
made their first estimate. EE is the estimation error. 
BR – IE = EE 
 
The formula used to calculate belief updates was as follows (RE is participants’ updated re-
estimate): 
For Positive EEs: RE – IE = Update 
For Negative EEs: IE – RE = Update 
 
Table 1: Categorisation of events. 
 Positive EE  
(BR > IE) 
 Negative EE  
(BR < IE) 
 
Positive Event 
 
Desirable Information 
  
Undesirable Information 
 
Negative Event Undesirable Information  Desirable Information 
  
Appendix C 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for participants’ probability estimates and the base rates 
presented by event type and information desirability. IE is the average initial estimate of how 
likely events are to occur to them. BR is the average base rate for events happening, as 
calculated by the base rate generator. RE is the updated re-estimate provided after participants 
have seen the base rate statistic. Figures show mean averages (standard deviations). 
 Positive Events  Negative Events 
 Undesirable 
Info 
Desirable 
Info 
Overall  Undesirable 
Info 
Desirable 
Info 
Overall 
 
IE 
 
62.78 
(25.85) 
 
 
26.19 
(22.30) 
 
41.85 
(29.96) 
  
25.32 
(19.28) 
 
52.15 
(24.70) 
 
34.09 
(24.65) 
BR 49.82 
(24.64) 
 
40.49 
(21.86) 
44.48 
(23.54) 
 39.71 
(19.59) 
39.70 
(22.60) 
39.71 
(20.61) 
RE 58.68 
(28.43) 
31.55 
(25.29) 
43.16 
(29.86) 
 29.64 
(21.48) 
44.80 
(27.15) 
34.59 
(24.53) 
 
  
Appendix D 
Table 3: Stimulus evaluations provided by participants after the belief update task. Familiarity 
(1 = low to 7 = high) and strength of valence ratings (1 = very negative to 7 = very positive) 
were assessed using a subjective, post-task questionnaire. 
 Positive Events 
Mean (SD) 
 Negative Events 
Mean (SD) 
Type of Information Undesirable Desirable  Undesirable Desirable 
 
Familiarity 
 
 
4.11 
(0.76) 
 
3.77 
(0.64) 
  
3.13 
(0.64) 
 
3.40 
(0.61) 
 
Strength of Valence 
 
5.97 
(0.45) 
 
5.80 
(0.49) 
  
1.77 
(0.33) 
 
1.89 
(0.32) 
*Note, all positive and negative events were perceived as positive and negative, respectively.   
Appendix E 
Table 4: The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9). 
Participants were asked “Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any 
of the following problems? 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much 
Feeling tired or having little energy 
Poor appetite or overeating 
Feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family 
down 
Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite — 
being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual 
Thoughts that you would be better off dead or of hurting 
yourself in some way 
Note: The PHQ-9 was originally developed by Kroenke, Spitzer and Williams (2001) and is 
commonly used in clinical settings to measure depression severity. 
  
Appendix F 
Table 5: The Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R) scale. 
Participants were asked to describe how much they agreed with the following statements 
In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
It's easy for me to relax 
If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
I'm always optimistic about my future. 
I enjoy my friends a lot 
It's important for me to keep busy 
I hardly ever expect things to go my way 
I don't get upset too easily 
I rarely count on good things happening to me. yourself in some way 
Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. 
Note: The LOT-R was developed by Scheier, Carver and Bridges (1994). Items 2, 5, 6, and 8 
are fillers. Items 3, 7 and 9 are reverse coded. 
 
 
